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Is the Rule of Capture 
Countenanced in the South 
China Sea? The Policy 
and Practice of China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam
Melissa H Loja*
This article examines the petroleum regimes of China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam to ascertain whether they countenance the rule of capture in the South 
China Sea. It concludes that the policy and practice of Vietnam clearly and 
absolutely do not countenance the application of the rule of capture in regard 
to potential or actual transboundary petroleum deposits in the South China Sea. 
On the other hand, China has maintained a 1996 secrecy regulation, which 
authorises China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) to undertake 
unilateral activities involving transboundary deposits in disputed areas of the 
South China Sea. At the same time, China has adopted bilateral declarations 
and agreements that preclude the application of the rule of capture in both 
delimited and undelimited areas of the South China Sea. As for Philippine 
policy and practice, there is ambivalence towards the potential or actual 
presence of transboundary deposits. 
A single petroleum deposit may traverse actual or potential boundaries on 
the continental shelf.1 If one state drills on its side of the boundary, that state 
* Melissa H Loja is a PhD candidate in the Faculty of Law, University of Hong Kong 
where she also obtained her LLM. She is under the supervision of Dr James Fry. 
Previously, she clerked for the Philippine Supreme Court. She can be contacted by 
email at h1198345@hku.hk.
1 Secretariat, International Law Commission, Memorandum on the High Seas, UN Doc 
A/CN4/32, 16 July 1950, 108–109; North Sea Continental Shelf Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, 
para 97.
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can capture the fluid and fugacious deposit, to the prejudice of the other 
states and the detriment of peaceful relations among them.2 In enclosed or 
semi-enclosed seas where there can be multiple overlapping claims to the 
continental shelf, resort to the rule of capture is likely to happen.3 One such 
semi-enclosed sea is the South China Sea where China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam are competing for the continental shelf. 
In the United States, the rule of capture means that the ‘owner of a tract 
of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells drilled 
thereon, though it may be proved that part of such oil or gas migrated 
from adjoining lands’.4 The adjoining owners have no cause of action 
for injunction or recovery.5 Their only recourse is to produce from offset 
wells drilled on their own lands.6 In the international context, the rule of 
capture comes into play when a single reservoir rock containing petroleum 
is located across the continental shelf boundary of two or more states, any 
one of which can drill on its own continental shelf, perforate the reservoir 
rock and cause the petroleum to migrate to its side.7 The rule of capture also 
operates in an undefined continental shelf boundary, such as when a claimant 
state ‘proceeds with the unilateral exploitation of the whole area claimed, 
including overlapping areas’, over the objection of the other claimant states. 
In the past, petroleum exploration and exploitation in the South China 
Sea were confined to undisputed areas close to the shores.8 However, since 
1992, exploration by China and Vietnam has been inching towards disputed 
deep-water areas where a number of their exploration and licensing blocks 
2 Special Rapporteur Chusei Yamada, Fourth Report on Shared Natural Resources, UN 
Doc A/CN4/580, 6 March 2007, 3–4; David Pike, ‘Cross-border Hydrocarbon Reserves’ 
in Richard Schofield, Territorial Foundations of the Gulf States (St Martin’s Press 1994), 
187–188; Terence Daintith, Finders Keepers? How the Law of Capture Shaped the World Oil 
Industry (RFF Press 2010), 370–372, 394.
3 Charles Robson, ‘Transboundary Petroleum Reservoir: Legal Issues and Solutions’ 
and Rodman Bundy, ‘Natural Resource Development (Oil and Gas) and Boundary 
Disputes’ in Gerald Blake et al, The Peaceful Management of Transboundary Resources 
(Graham and Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff 1995). 
4  Robert Hardwicke, ‘The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas’ 
(1935) 13 Texas Law Review 393. 
5 Ibid.
6 See Westmoreland and Cambria Natural Gas Co v De Witt, 18 A 724 (Pa 1889); Kelly v Ohio 
Oil Co, 39 LRA 765 (1897).
7 Yamada, n 2 above, 4.
8 Leszek Buszynski and Iskandar Sazlan,  ‘Maritime Claims and Energy Cooperation in 
the South China Sea’ (2007) 29 Contemporary Southeast Asia 149–150, 157–158.
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now overlap.9 The overlap has triggered protests and counter-protests 
between them.10 Thus, this article asks: is the rule of capture countenanced 
in the South China Sea? What does international law provide? What do the 
policies and practices of China, the Philippines and Vietnam indicate? If the 
three states are poised to practise the rule of capture, there is bleak chance 
for peace in the South China Sea. However, if their policies and practices do 
not countenance the rule of capture, this represents a minimum standard 
of an acceptable and expected behaviour in the South China Sea. 
This article consists of four parts, including this introduction. The 
second part considers whether the rule of capture is countenanced under 
international law, specifically the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS). There is a debate among scholars on whether 
international law imposes: 
1. a substantive obligation to refrain from applying the rule of capture; 
2. a procedural obligation to negotiate in order to reach agreement on 
the apportionment of the deposit; and 
3. a substantive obligation to adopt a specific mode of apportionment of 
the deposit. 
The second part of this article also provides a summary of the debate with 
reference only to the substantive obligation to refrain from applying the 
rule of capture and the procedural obligation to negotiate. The third part of 
this article considers how the petroleum regimes of China, the Philippines 
and Vietnam deal with the potential or actual presence of transboundary 
petroleum deposits in the South China Sea. The key elements of their 
petroleum regimes are: 
1. laws on natural resource ownership; 
2. regulations on offshore petroleum exploration and development; 
3. model offshore petroleum contracts; and 
4. bilateral or multilateral declarations or agreements.11 
9 Shicun Wu and Nong Hong, ‘Energy Security of China and the Oil and Gas 
Exploitation in the South China Sea’ in University of Virginia, Myron Nordquist, John 
Norton Moore and Kuncheng Fu, Recent Developments in the Law of the Sea and China (M 
Nijhoff 2006); Leszek Buszynski, ‘The South China Sea: Oil, Maritime Claims, and US–
China Strategic Rivalry’ (2012) 35 The Washington Quarterly 139–156.
10 Paul Blyschak, ‘Offshore Oil and Gas Projects Amid Maritime Border Disputes: 
Applicable Law’ (2013) 6 Journal of World Energy Law and Business 226; Zou 
Keyuan, ‘Joint Development in the South China Sea: A New Approach’ (2006) 21 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 87); Sanqiang Jian, ‘Multinational Oil 
Companies and the Spratly Dispute’ (1997) 6 Journal of Contemporary China 596–599.
11 William Onorato, ‘Legislative Frameworks Used to Foster Petroleum Development’ 
(1995) Policy Research Working Paper No 1420, Legal Department, World Bank.
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The concluding part assesses the minimum consensus among the three 
countries on whether they have a substantive obligation to refrain from 
applying the rule of capture in the South China Sea and a procedural 
obligation to inform and negotiate. 
International law and the rule of capture
Under UNCLOS, a coastal state has full territorial sovereignty over its 
territorial waters,12 but it has only sovereign rights with respect to the 
continental shelf.13 Sovereign rights give the coastal state functional 
jurisdiction to explore and exploit the natural resources on its seabed and 
subsoil.14 These rights are inherent for the coastal state may exercise them 
without the need for prior proclamation or occupation of the continental 
shelf;15 they are also exclusive for if the coastal state ‘does not explore the 
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake 
these activities without [its] express consent’.16 The only limitations to 
these rights are an existing maritime boundary17 and the free status of the 
superjacent water and air space.18 However, as Hurst noted, under the Truman 
Proclamation on the continental shelf,19 the US expressed willingness to 
negotiate the delimitation of its continental shelf, but gave ‘no indication 
of any willingness to discuss with another State any questions of what the 
United States may or may not do in connection with the resources of what 
it proclaims to be its Continental Shelf, or with the steps it takes for the 
purpose of winning these resources from the sea bed and the subsoil of the 
Continental Shelf’.20 In other words, within its boundaries a coastal state can 
undertake any activity to win the deposit.21 
What about a transboundary petroleum deposit: can a coastal state apply 
the rule of capture and undertake any activity to win the deposit? To address 
12 Article 2 of UNCLOS.
13 Ibid Art 77.
14 Ibid Arts 77.1 and 77.4.
15 Ibid Art 77.3. 
16 Ibid Art 77.2.
17 Ibid Art 83.
18 Ibid Art 78.
19 Proclamation 2667, Policy of the United States With Respect to the Natural Resources 
of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, 28 September 1945.
20 Cecil Hurst, ‘The Continental Shelf’ (1948) 34 Transactions of the Grotius Society 162. 
See, however, the 2012 US-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement, which is 
pending ratification by the US Senate.
21 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford 
University Press 1995), 138–139. See, also, Gilbert Gidel, ‘The Continental Shelf’ trans 
L F E Goldie (1954–1956) 3 UW Austl Ann L Rev 97.
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this question, it is important to consider the ownership status of an offshore 
petroleum deposit in situ.22 
To recall, a coastal state has territorial sovereignty over its territorial sea 
but only sovereign rights or functional jurisdiction over its continental shelf. 
For Higgins, the difference is crucial for in the exercise of its territorial 
sovereignty a state can apply laws relating to the ownership of a deposit in 
situ in its territorial sea.23 In contrast, in the exercise of sovereign rights 
or functional jurisdiction the state can apply only those laws that relate to 
activities for the exploration and exploitation of a deposit in situ on the 
continental shelf;24 it cannot apply property laws reserving state ownership or 
allowing private ownership of the deposit.25 A state that claims ‘ownership of 
the natural resources in the subsoil of... the continental shelf area... exceed[s] 
its rights in international law’.26 
There are some who disagree with Higgins. Redgwell noted that UNCLOS 
is silent on the issue of title,27 and because of this silence, ‘[i]n practice, a 
legal fiction is employed by most States which amounts to the assimilation 
of the continental shelf and land territory for jurisdictional purposes’.28 
This implies that it is ‘up to the coastal state to exercise its sovereign rights 
with regard to ownership of the natural resources on its continental shelf’.29 
For Onorato, it is an established rule that coastal states have a ‘right of 
disposal’ and an ‘affirmative, vested interest in [the deposit] in situ’.30 It follows 
that all the overlying coastal states have joint ownership of a transboundary 
22 Daintith, n 2 above, 407. Daintith pointed out that knowing the exact property rule 
applicable to transboundary offshore deposits is more important than knowing whether 
cooperation in the exploitation of these deposits is customary international law.
23 See D W Bowett, ‘Jurisdiction: Changing Patterns of Authority over Activities and 
Resources’ (1982) 53 British Yearbook of International Law 6–7.
24 Higgins, n 21 above, 138.
25 Ibid.
26 Anita Rønne, ‘Energy Law in Denmark’ in Martha Roggenkamp et al, Energy Law in 
Europe: National, EU, and International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press 
2001), 336. Rønne referred to Denmark whose Subsoil Act and Act on the Continental 
Shelf provides that ‘the natural resources of the Danish continental shelf are the 
property of the State of Denmark’ (ibid 335). 
27 Catherine Redgwell, ‘International Regulation of Energy Activities’ in Martha 
Roggenkamp et al, Energy Law in Europe: National, EU, and International Law and 
Institutions (Oxford University Press 2001), 30.
28 Ibid. 
29 Ulf Hammer, ‘Models for State Ownership on the Norwegian Continental Shelf’ in 
Aileen McHarg, Barry Barton, Adrian Bradbrook and Lee Godden, Property and the Law 
in Energy and Natural Resources (Oxford University Press 2010), 159–160.
30 William Onorato, ‘Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit’ 
(1977) 26 Int’l and Comp LQ 328. See also William Onorato and J Jay Park, ‘World 
Petroleum Legislation: Frameworks that Foster Oil and Gas Development’ (2001–2002) 
39 Alta L Rev 73–74.
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deposit in situ.31 As joint owners, these states have a binding obligation not 
to impair each other’s rights and interests, to refrain from the unilateral 
exploitation of the deposit and to agree on a mode of apportionment of 
the deposit.32 Even in the absence of a special agreement, these obligations 
are binding33 for their source is customary international law based on the 
practice of states in treating a transboundary resource as joint property.34 
While agreeing with Onorato that coastal states can reserve ownership 
of a deposit in situ on the continental shelf,35 Lagoni argued that this 
does not make the coastal states ipso facto joint owners of a transboundary 
deposit.36 Rather, there is state practice not just in joint ownership but also in 
geological cooperation and unitisation in which states retain their sovereign 
rights to the deposit.37 Each ‘state... [has to] cooperate in order to protect 
its territorial integrity or sovereign rights to the minerals in place, and... 
to comply with international law on the inviolability of foreign territorial 
sovereignty and sovereign right [of others]’.38 Thus, such state practice to 
refrain from applying the rule of capture and to negotiate is impelled by 
policy considerations rather than a conviction of joint ownership.39 It would 
seem that Onorato and Lagoni differ mainly in their preferred mode of 
cooperation in the exploitation of the deposit. However, as stated earlier, 
this particular aspect of the debate is outside the scope of the present article.
Daintith also found no basis for treating a transboundary deposit as shared 
property.40 In his view, in the context of their maritime boundary agreement, 
31 William Onorato, ‘Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum Deposit’ 
(1968) 17 Int’l and Comp LQ 87, 99–100; Onorato, n 30 above, 325. In his 1968 
article, Onorato prescribed a rule lex ferenda of correlative rights and cooperative and 
non-competitive exploitation. He based the prescribed rule on state practice at the 
municipal level, for at that time there was no practice in the international context 
(ibid 89–93). In his 1977 article, Onorato argued that joint ownership has become 
customary international law based on state practice (ibid 325). See also J C Woodliffe, 
‘International Unitisation of an Offshore Gas Field’ (1977) 26 Int’l and Comp LQ 353.
32 Onorato (1977), n 30 above, 328–329. 
33 Ibid 327.
34 Ibid 330–331. See also William Onorato, ‘Joint Development in the International 
Petroleum Sector: The Yemeni Variant’ (1990) 39 Int’l and Comp LQ 654. 
35 Rainier Lagoni, ‘Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers’ (1979) 73 AJIL 
216. However, in a 1980 article, Onorato noted that in the North Sea context the 
participating states retained their sovereign rights over the deposit. See William 
Onorato, ‘Joint Development of Seabed Hydrocarbon Resources: An Overview of 
Precedents in the North Sea’ in Mark Valencia (ed), The South China Sea: Hydrocarbon 
Potential and Possibilities of Joint Development (Pergamon Press Ltd 1981), 1314.
36 Ibid 220–223. See also Woodliffe, n 31 above, 340.
37 Lagoni, ibid 228. 
38 Ibid 235.
39 Ibid. 
40 Daintith, n 2 above, 406–407.
489Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea?
states maintain exclusive sovereign rights over their respective portions of 
the deposit.41 However, unlike Lagoni, Daintith argued that, unless it gives 
its consent by way of a special agreement, a coastal state has no obligation to 
cooperate with the opposite or adjacent state.42 Among those who hold this 
view, one group believes that said state cannot be restrained from undertaking 
unilateral activities, in the sense that if that state refuses to cooperate, it would 
not be deemed to have violated international law.43 
Another group argues that unilateral activities are not permissible for said 
state has an obligation to notify, consult and negotiate with the objective 
of reaching an agreement on the mode of apportionment of the deposit.44 
However, this second group acknowledges that said state would be justified 
to undertake unilateral activities if the other state unreasonably refuses to 
negotiate or cooperate.45 Within this second group, some argue that the 
obligation to negotiate arises only in the context of ‘an agreed boundary 
area where a known field straddles the boundary’,46 while others say that the 
obligation to negotiate arises from general international law, as interpreted in 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid 406–407, 433, 435; Bundy, n 3 above, 24; Peter Cameron, ‘The Rules of 
Engagement: Developing Cross-border Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and 
the Caribbean’ (2006) 55 Int’l and Comp LQ 561, 564, 570; Hazel Fox et al, Joint 
Development of Offshore Oil and Gas (British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law 1989), 35; Ian Brownlie, ‘Legal Status of Natural Resources in International Law 
(some aspects)’ (1979) 162 Recueil des Cours 289.
43 Bundy, n 3 above, citing the case of Iran and Abu Dhabi with respect to the Abu al 
Bukoosh – ABK field; Joseph Morris, ‘The North Sea Continental Shelf: Oil and Gas 
Legal Problems’ (1967–1968) 2 International Lawyer 207–208. Cameron noted this 
practice of China and Japan in the East China Sea, and by Iran and Qatar over the 
South Pars/North Field gas deposit (see Cameron, n 42 above, 559).
44 David Ong, ‘Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas Deposits: Mere 
State Practice or Customary International Law’ (1999) 93 AJIL 795; Masahiro 
Miyoshi, ‘The Basic Concept of Joint Development of Hydrocarbon Resources on 
the Continental Shelf’ (1988) 3 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal 
Law 18. See, also, Daintith, n 2 above, 433; Brownlie, n 42 above; and Bundy, n 3 
above, 39. Bundy is careful to emphasise that while there might be an emerging 
custom to consult and notify, there is no obligation to unitise or jointly develop a 
transboundary deposit.
45 Daintith, n 2 above, 433; Cameron, n 42 above; Blyschak, n 10 above. See, also, Special 
Unit for South-South Cooperation, United Nations Development Programme, Effective 
Hydrocarbon Management: Lessons from the South (UNDP 2009), 30.
46 Daintith, n 2 above, 433, 435; Fox, n 42 above, 35. However, Cameron noted that 
in the North Sea and the Caribbean Sea the new practice is to adopt a framework 
agreement with a standby cooperation clause, which comes into operation once a 
deposit is ascertained to be exploitable by any of the bordering states. See Cameron, 
n 42 above.
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the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf decision47 and Guyana/Suriname Arbitration,48 
as well as from customary law based on the practice of specially affected states.49 
Perhaps adding to the uncertainty over the applicable international law 
is the decision of the International Law Commission that it ‘should not take 
up the consideration of the transboundary oil and gas aspects of the topic 
[s]hared natural resources’.50 The decision was made in light of objections 
to codification by majority of the delegations in the Sixth Committee of the 
General Assembly.51 Some of the delegations that objected to codification 
of an international law on transboundary oil and gas found no basis ‘for 
the Commission to try to extrapolate customary international law, common 
principles or best practices from the divergent and sparse State practice in 
this area’.52 
Set against such diverse views, the next part of this article turns to the 
offshore petroleum policies and practices of China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam to ascertain how they perceive their rights and obligations in regard 
to potential or actual transboundary deposits in the South China Sea.
Offshore petroleum regimes of China, the Philippines and Vietnam
Conflict has prevented the full survey of the South China Sea;53 consequently, 
its potential in situ petroleum resources and recoverable reserves remain 
unknown.54 There are estimates, but they vary widely, from the most 
optimistic estimates of 213,000 million barrels (Mb) of oil reserve and 
47 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v Turkey): Request for the Indication of 
Interim Measures of Protection, ICJ Order 11 September 1976 (ICJ Reports 1976, 3).
48 Guyana v Suriname, Arbitral Award made 17 September 2007 (Guyana/Suriname).
49 Ong, n 44 above; Miyoshi, n 44 above; Blyschak, n 10 above; Dominic Roughton, 
‘Rights (and Wrongs) of Capture: International Law and the Implications of the 
Guyana/Suriname Arbitration’ (2008) 26 JERL 374.
50 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/65/10, Supplement No 10, General Assembly Official 
Records Sixty-fifth session, paras 377 and 384.
51 Ibid.
52 UN General Assembly, UN Doc A/CN4/620, Topical summary of the discussion held in 
the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly during its sixty-fourth session, 26 January 
2010, para 61.
53 International Energy Agency, China’s Worldwide Quest for Energy Security (OECD 2009), 
57–59, www.oecdchina.org/OECDpdf/china2000.pdf. This is not to discount cost as 
a factor that discourages exploration. According to Smith, in the 1990s, ‘a well in the 
North Sea might cost $7.5 million to complete, while a well drilled off the coast of 
China may cost $15-20 million’. This is due to water depths, weather conditions and 
water currents. See Ernest Smith et al, Materials on International Petroleum Transactions 
(Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation 1993), 456.
54 Ibid.
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475,000 million barrels of oil equivalent (Mboe) of natural gas reserve 55 to 
the most conservative estimates issued by the US Geological Survey (2010)56 
of 1,500 to 5000 Mb of oil reserve and 22,200 to 23,800 Mboe of natural gas 
reserve.57 These estimated recoverable reserves are found in nine hydrocarbon 
provinces,58 which are either encompassed or traversed by the U-shaped 
maritime boundary line drawn by China,59 although in the Song Hong basin, 
the U-shaped line is presumed to track an agreed maritime boundary between 
China and Vietnam.60 For this reason it is possible for offshore petroleum 
deposits to traverse potential or actual boundaries in the South China Sea.61 The 
succeeding sections discuss whether, in regard to such transboundary deposits, 
China, the Philippines and Vietnam consider the rule of capture permissible. 
Recognition of coexisting interests in a transboundary deposit 
This section examines the petroleum regimes of the three countries to 
determine whether they reserve ownership of the deposits in situ on their 
continental shelf and, at the same time, acknowledge that other states 
may have coexisting interests in the same deposits. It is important also to 
know whether they accept an obligation to notify and negotiate prior to 
undertaking exploration or exploitation activities. 
cHina
China’s 1947 map with a U-shaped line is often interpreted as a claim to 
the enclosed waters as territorial sea by historic right.62 However, such 
55 According to the International Energy Agency, it is not confirmed whether China 
issued these estimates (ibid 59).
56 US Geological Survey, Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of Southeast Asia 
(US Department of the Interior, US Geological Survey 2010). 
57 Nick Owen and Clive Schofield, ‘Disputed South China Sea Hydrocarbons in 
Perspective’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 815–818. 
58 Ibid 814. The hydrocarbon provinces are Pearl River mouth basin, Song Hong basin, 
Phu Khanh basin, Cuu Long basin, Nam Con Song basin, South China Sea platform, 
Palawan Shelf basin, Baram Delta/Brunei Sabah basin and Greater Sarawak basin. 
59 Ibid Fig 2.
60 Agreement between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist Republic of 
Viet Nam on the delimitation of the territorial seas, exclusive economic zones and 
continental shelves of the two countries in Beibu Gulf/Bac Bo Gulf (with maps), 2336 
UNTS 41860. The agreement is referred to as the Gulf of Tonkin agreement.
61 See Rongxing Guo, Cross-border Resource Management: Theory and Practice (Elsevier 2005), 
113–114.
62 See the discussion in Zou Keyuan, ‘Historic Right in International Law and in China’s 
Practice’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development and International Law 162 and Jianming 
Shen, ‘China’s Sovereignty over the South China Sea Islands: A Historical Perspective’ 
(2002) 1 Chinese Journal of International Law 129–130. 
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interpretation is belied by the Declaration of the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China of China’s Territorial Sea dated 4 September 1958,63 which 
admits of the presence of high seas within the enclosed waters: 
‘The Government of the People’s Republic of China declares:
1. The breadth of the territorial sea of the People’s Republic of China 
shall be twelve nautical miles. This provision applies to… the Xisha 
Islands, the Zhongsha Islands, the Nansha Islands and all other islands 
belonging to China which are separated from the mainland and its 
coastal islands by the high seas.’ 64
Therefore, in this article China’s claim to the vast waters enclosed by the 
U-shaped line is treated under the regime of the continental shelf.65 
As stated earlier, under the regime of the continental shelf, a coastal state 
has only sovereign rights or functional jurisdiction over petroleum activities. 
Accordingly, in its Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental 
Shelf (1998), China acknowledges that it has ‘sovereign rights over the 
continental shelf for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural 
resources’.66 However, in its constitution and mineral resource laws China 
claims state ownership of all mineral resources,67 which are ‘either near the 
earth’s surface or underground’,68 in its ‘territory... and in the sea areas 
under its jurisdiction’.69 In particular, ‘[a]ll petroleum resources in the... 
continental shelf of the People’s Republic of China... are owned by the 
People’s Republic of China’.70
None of the foregoing laws on petroleum resources defines the ownership 
status of a transboundary petroleum deposit in situ on the continental shelf 
63 Limits in the Sea No 43 (1978).
64 The reference to the high seas is omitted in the Law on the Territorial Sea and the 
Contiguous Zone of the People’s Republic of China dated 25 February 1992.
65 See James Fry and Melissa Loja, ‘The Roots of Historic Title: Non-Western Pre-Colonial 
Normative Systems and Legal Resolution of Territorial Disputes’, (2014) 27 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 750. 
66 Article 4 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (1998).
67 Article 9 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982), as amended; Art 
3 of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (1986), as amended.
68 Article 3 of the Mineral Resources Law; Art 3 of the Rules for the Implementation of 
the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (1994), as amended in 
2007.
69 Article 4 of the Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of China (1986), as 
amended in 1994.
70 Article 2 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign 
Cooperative Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources (1982), as amended in 
2001 and 2011; hereinafter referred to as Offshore Regulations.
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of China and a neighbouring state.71 However, it is important to point out 
that under a 1996 rule on state secrets,72 China categorised as top secret 
information regarding the ‘[d]iscovery of resources at areas or sea areas in 
dispute between [China] and neighboring countries and the assessment and 
decisions thereon during the exploration and exploitation of oil resources 
by [China]’.73 As top secret, such information ‘[concerns] the security 
and interest of the State... and [is] only accessible by a certain group of 
people during a certain period of time as determined according to legal 
procedures’.74 The regulation was promulgated by the State Secrecy Bureau, 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec) and CNOOC.75 The regulation implies that, in regard 
to a potential or actual transboundary offshore deposit in a disputed area, 
China perceives no obligation to notify or consult with a competing state 
unless a legal procedure has been agreed upon. The recent deployment of 
the Haiyang Shiyou 981 rig in waters off the Paracel Islands is a case in point 
for these waters are not subject to any agreement with Vietnam, unlike the 
waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, which have been partially delimited.76
The foregoing 1996 secrecy regulation is still valid even today.77 
However, in 2000 China entered into a maritime boundary agreement 
with Vietnam affecting the Gulf of Tonkin. Under Article VII, China 
agreed with Vietnam that:
‘If any single petroleum or natural gas structure or field, or other 
mineral deposit of whatever character, extends across the delimitation 
line defined in Article II of this Agreement, the two Contracting 
Parties shall, through friendly consultations, reach agreement as to the 
manner in which the structure, field or deposit will be most effectively 
exploited as well as on the equitable sharing of the benefits arising 
from such exploitation.’78
71 There are provisions relating to concession blocks that extend to another administrative 
unit within the territory of China (see Art 49 of the Mineral Resources Law as amended). 
However, these provisions do not deal with mineral deposits that straddle boundaries.
72 Provisions on the Scope of State Secrets in the Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries 
and their Confidentiality Levels, promulgated by the State Secrecy Bureau, China 
National Petroleum Corporation, China Petrochemical Corporation and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation, 6 April 1996.
73 Ibid Art 3, s 1, para 8.
74 Ibid Art 2.
75 Ibid.
76 UN Doc No A/68/887, Annex to the letter dated 22 May 2014 from the Chargé 
d’affaires ai [sic] of the Permanent Mission of China to the UN addressed to the 
Secretary-General.
77 Last accessed from Westlaw China, 28 April 2014 at 10:57.
78 See n 60.
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Article VII is an acknowledgment by the parties that they have a 
coexisting interest in a petroleum deposit that straddles their boundary, 
and an obligation to consult in order to reach agreement on the effective 
exploitation of the deposit and its equitable apportionment.79 The 1996 
secrecy regulation is clearly incompatible with Article VII of the Gulf of 
Tonkin agreement. 
Article VII is similar in tenor to the ‘unity of deposit’ clause in the 1965 
maritime boundary agreement between the United Kingdom and Norway.80 
This ‘unity of deposit’ clause has been incorporated into almost every 
maritime boundary agreement81 concluded after 1965, so much so that 
it now represents an authoritative international petroleum practice.82 In 
2006, pursuant to the terms of Article VII of the Gulf of Tonkin agreement, 
CNOOC, as the state corporation mandated to conduct the upstream 
offshore petroleum business of China,83 and Vietnam Oil and Gas Group 
or PetroVietnam, as the national petroleum corporation of Vietnam,84 
entered into an Agreement on Joint Exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin.85 
The agreement has since been amended to intensify ‘exploration of the oil 
and gas composition that cuts cross the delimitation line’86 in the Gulf of 
Tonkin. The agreement has also been reinforced by the adoption of basic 
79 Ibid.
80 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway relating to the 
delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries, 10 March 1965, 551 
UNTS 213. Article IV reads:
‘If any single geological petroleum structure or petroleum field, or any single 
geological structure or field of any other mineral deposit, including sand or 
gravel, extends across the dividing line and the part of such structure or field 
which is situated on one side of the dividing line is exploitable, wholly or in 
part, from the other side of the dividing line, the Contracting Parties shall, 
in consultation with the licensees, if any, seek to reach agreement as to the 
manner in which the structure or field shall be most effectively exploited and 
the manner in which the proceeds deriving therefrom shall be apportioned.’
81 Douglas Johnston, The Theory and History of Ocean Boundary-making (McGill-Queen’s 
University Press 1988), 217; Cameron, n 42 above, 577, 579.
82 Department of Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, United Nations Handbook on the 
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries (United Nations Publications 2000) 38, 80–83. 
83 Article 6 of the 1982 Offshore Regulations, n 70 above.
84 Prime Minister of Government Decision No 198/2006/QD-TTg Approving the Scheme 
on the Formation of the Vietnam National Oil and Gas Group, 29 August 2006. 
85 Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Vietnam-China 
Joint Statement, dated 24 June 2013’, www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/
nr040807105001/ns130624152141/newsitem_print_preview. The text of the agreement 
itself is not in the public domain.
86 Ibid.
495Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea?
principles guiding the settlement of maritime issues,87 one principle being 
that, pending further maritime delimitation of the Gulf of Tonkin, China 
and Vietnam shall ‘actively [discuss] co-operation for mutual development 
on these waters’.88 These bilateral agreements and declarations are a clear 
signal by the two states of their views on the status of a transboundary deposit 
across their defined boundary. CNOOC’s 1996 secrecy regulation ought not 
to apply in this boundary.
Finally, in 2004, CNOOC signed with the Philippine National Oil 
Company (PNOC)89 ‘An Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking in 
Certain Areas in the South China Sea’, 90 and in 2005, with both PNOC and 
PetroVietnam, a ‘Tripartite Agreement for Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking 
in the Agreement Area in the South China Sea’91 (JMSU). Based on their 
official statement,92 the three national oil companies will ‘jointly collect 2D 
and 3D seismic data and process the existing 2D seismic data in the agreement 
area of over 140,000 square kilometers in the South China Sea’,93 without 
undermining ‘the basic positions held by their respective Governments on the 
South China Sea issue’.94 The JMSU fell through, for reasons to be discussed 
under the section on the Philippines.95 Nonetheless, it is emphasised that 
unlike the 2006 joint exploration agreement between CNOOC and PVN, 
which pertains to a delimited area of the Gulf of Tonkin, the 2005 JMSU 
pertained to an area of the South China Sea, which had not been delimited. 
Nonetheless, the terms of the JMSU precluded the application of CNOOC’s 
1996 secrecy regulation to that disputed area.
It can be summed up that China claims state ownership of surface and 
underground petroleum resources on the continental shelf. 96 With respect 
to transboundary petroleum deposits in the disputed area in the South 
87 An official text of the basic principles can be found in the press release of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam: ‘VN-China basic principles on settlement of sea issues’ 
(VNA – 12 October 2011) http://en.vietnamplus.vn/Home/VNChina-basic-principles-
on-settlement-of-sea-issues/201110/21524.vnplus.
88 Paragraph 5 of the Agreement on Basic Principles.
89 The authority of PNOC to sign the agreement is based on Presidential Decree 334, 9 
November 1973. 
90 The official text of the agreement is not in the public domain. 
91 Ibid. 
92 A copy is posted on the PRC foreign ministry website, available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm. 
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95  See, generally, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the 
Philippines’ Statement on the South China Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
People’s Republic of China, available at www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/wjbt/
t1059343.htm.
96 Article 3 of the Mineral Resources Law.
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China Sea, the 1996 secrecy regulation promulgated by CNOOC indicates 
that China does not perceive an obligation towards other claimant states 
to refrain from unilateral exploration and exploitation or to notify and 
consult for the purpose of reaching an agreement on a mode of cooperation. 
However, China entered into bilateral agreements that override the 1996 
secrecy regulation in the sense that, in both delimited and undelimited areas 
of the South China Seas, China acknowledged that other states may have 
a coexisting interest in a potential or actual transboundary deposit, and 
committed to cooperate in the survey or exploration of these areas.
vietnam
Under its Constitution, Vietnam claims title to all mineral resources ‘lying 
underground or coming from... the continental shelf’.97 This claim to title 
is reiterated in its Petroleum Law, which considers ‘[a]ll petroleum existing 
in the subsoil of... [the] exclusive economic zone and continental shelf of 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam... [as] property of the Vietnamese people 
under the sole management of the State of Vietnam’.98 
However, the implementing rules99 of the Petroleum Law provide that 
the Vietnamese Government, which exercises state management over 
all petroleum activities, shall decide on ‘issues related to cooperation 
in oil and gas activities in areas where overlappings with foreign 
countries occur’.100 This provision of the implementing rules was later 
incorporated as Article 38 of the amended Petroleum Law of 2008.101 
The amended Petroleum Law delegated to the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade ‘the prime responsibility for submitting to the Prime Minister 
for approval… foreign cooperation schemes for oil and gas activities 
in overlapping areas with foreign countries’102 and ‘to carr y out 
international cooperation on oil and gas’.103 Such cooperation may take 
97 Article 17 of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. This Constitution 
was unanimously approved by the 8th National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam at its 11th session, 15 April 1992. 
98 Article 1 of the Petroleum Law, effective 1 September 1993, as amended in 2000.
99 Decree No 84-CP Detailing the Implementation of the Petroleum Law, 17 December 
1996. See also Art 64 of Decree No 48/2000/ND-CP Detailing the Implementation of 
the Petroleum Law, 12 September 2000.
100 Decree No 84-CP, ibid Art 58.
101 Law Amending and Supplementing a Number of Articles of the Petroleum Law,  
3 June 2008.
102 Ibid Art 38(2).
103 Ibid. The Petroleum Law of 1993 and the Law on Amendment and Supplementation 
to a number of Articles of the Petroleum Law on 2000 did not contain any provision 
dealing with contract areas that overlap with those of a foreign country.
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the form of a petroleum joint venture enterprise ‘established under... 
a Treaty entered into by and between the Government of Vietnam and 
a foreign government’.104
Moreover, it has been shown in the previous section that, under Article VII 
of its Gulf of Tonkin agreement and the 2011 agreement on basic principles 
with China, Vietnam accepts the idea that its title may coexist with the title 
of China in a single mineral deposit lying across their boundary. Vietnam 
is also a party to a memorandum of understanding with Malaysia on joint 
exploration and exploitation of a defined area of their continental shelf in the 
Gulf of Thailand.105 Vietnam agreed with Malaysia that ‘[w]here a petroleum 
field is located partly in the Defined Area and partly outside that area in the 
continental shelf of Malaysia or the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, as the 
case may be, both parties shall arrive at mutually acceptable terms for the 
exploration and exploitation of petroleum therein’.106 The same provision 
can be found in the 1997 maritime boundary agreement of Vietnam with 
Thailand in another part of the Gulf of Thailand.107
Finally, PetroVietnam is party to the JMSU as well as the 2006 Agreement 
on Joint Exploration in the Gulf of Tonkin,108 both of which recognise the 
coexisting interests of states in a transboundary petroleum deposit in the 
South China Sea.
In sum, like China, Vietnam claims state ownership of the underlying 
mineral resources of its continental shelf in the South China Sea. At the 
same time, in its petroleum laws and regulations, Vietnam unilaterally 
accepts that other states may have coexisting interests in a potential or actual 
transboundary petroleum deposit. Additionally, its bilateral agreements and 
undertakings in the South China Sea reflect the same policy and practice. 
Vietnam leaves to negotiation only those details on the mode and extent 
of cooperation. 
104 Article 3(10) of the Petroleum Law.
105 Memorandum of Understanding between Malaysia and the Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam for the Exploration and Exploitation of Petroleum in a Defined Area of 
the Continental Shelf Involving the Two Countries was signed on 5 June 1992 and 
entered into force on 4 June 1993. Copy available at Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Vol 6 (Oxford University Press 2012), 463.
106 Ibid II (2).
107 Article IV of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam on the delimitation of the 
maritime boundary between the two countries in the Gulf of Thailand, effective  
9 August 1997, as reported in 39 Law of the Sea Bulletin 23.
108 The agreement took effect on 30 June 2007, after the respective governments approved 
the agreement signed by their nominees CNOOC and PetroVietnam (see Vietnam 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Gov’t gives nod to Tokin Gulf oil deal with China’ Foreign 
Affairs News, 1 November 2007).
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pHilippines
Under its 1949 Petroleum Law and 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the 
Philippines claims sovereign rights to its continental shelf,109 and full title 
to the underlying mineral resources.110 These claims apply to areas in the 
South China Sea, specifically the Kalayaan Group of Islands (a major portion 
of the Spratly Islands)111 and Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal).112 
Unlike Vietnam, the Philippines has no law or regulation dealing with the 
potential or actual presence of petroleum deposits that straddle an agreed 
or disputed boundary on the continental shelf. Consequently, Philippine 
practice in bilateral agreements relating to transboundary deposits is not 
consistent. In 2005, PNOC signed a JMSU with an explicit caveat that ‘the 
basic positions held by their respective governments on the South China 
Sea issue’ will not be compromised.113 PNOC was authorised to sign the 
JMSU under a Non-Exclusive Geophysical Permit purportedly issued by the 
Department of Energy.114
In 2008, Philippine legislators questioned PNOC for entering into a JMSU 
without submitting the agreement to congressional approval, which, in the 
minds of these legislators, is a mandatory requirement, for the agreement was 
deemed no ordinary commercial contract, as its terms affected Philippine 
claims to sovereignty.115 Moreover, the JMSU was perceived by the media as 
109 Article 1 of the 1973 Constitution; Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution. Under the 1935 
Philippine Constitution, all natural resources found within Philippine territory belong 
to the state (Art XII, s 1). However, as defined under Art 1, the Philippine territory 
included only the main land territory and the islands ceded by Spain to the US. The 
concepts of the EEZ and continental shelf were not yet recognised.
110 Article XIII, s 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art XIV, s 8 of the 1973 Constitution; Art XII, s 
2 of the 1987 Constitution; Art 3 of the Petroleum Act of 1949; s 10 of the Oil Exploration 
and Development Act of 1972, as amended by Presidential Decree 1857 (1983).
111 Presidential Decree 1596, 11 June 1978.
112 Republic Act 9522, 28 July 2008. As early as 1916, the US colonial government 
declared Masinloc part of Philippine territory (see Book I, Chapter 2, Art II, Act 
2657, 21 December 1916; Book I, Art II, s 38, Act 2711, 10 March 1917 of the 
American colonial government).
113 The agreement was announced by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm. The official 
text is not in the public domain. Consequently, the exact nature of the exploration or 
survey to be conducted cannot be ascertained. 
114 As cited in Congressional Record, Plenary Proceedings of the 14th Congress, First 
Regular Session, House of Representatives, Vol 4, No 66, 10 March 2008, at 194. The 
text of the permit is not in the public domain. It is not clear whether CNOOC or 
PetroVietnam also were named in the permit.
115 Senate Resolution No 319: Joint marine seismic agreement/Spratly Islands, 14th 
Congress, 5 March 2008; Congressional Record, Plenary Proceedings of the 14th 
Congress, First Regular Session, House of Representatives, Vol 4, No 66, 10 March 2008 
at 194. 
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a blunder, for the survey area covered portions of the Philippine territory, 
which were not being claimed by China or Vietnam.116 It was feared that the 
JMSU covered concession areas that the Philippines had earlier awarded to 
NorAsia and Forum Energy, respectively.117 In the wake of the controversy, 
PNOC let the JMSU expire in 2008.118 
At the time of expiration, the JMSU had generated regional 2D seismic 
data, which the parties were left to interpret individually.119 Reacting to 
the Philippine decision not to extend the agreement, China declared ‘it is 
regrettable that over recent years, the Philippines has changed its attitude and 
approach in handling the issue, gone back on its consensus with China’.120 
The statement seems to imply that China considers the Philippine withdrawal 
from the JMSU a breach of the procedural requirement outlined in Guyana 
v Suriname. 
In lieu of the JMSU, the Philippines proposed a Zone of Peace, Freedom, 
Friendship and Cooperation or ZoPFFC.121 In his 2011 State of the Nation 
Address, Philippine President Benigno Aquino described ZoPFFC as a mode 
of cooperation to be carried out by ‘segregating first the disputed relevant 
features of the Spratlys from the undisputed waters of the West Philippine Sea 
in accordance with the UNCLOS… [a]fter which, claimant countries would 
then be enabled to engage in joint cooperation including joint development 
or establishment of a Marine Peace Park in the disputed relevant features of 
the Spratlys’.122 Evidently, ZoPFFC does not contemplate a situation where 
petroleum deposit crosses contested or uncontested boundaries where an 
important function of a seismic survey jointly undertaken by the disputing 
116 Mark Valencia, ‘In response to Robert Beckman’, RSIS Commentaries 53/2007. See 
also Barry Wain, ‘Manila’s Bungle in the South China Sea (Jan/Feb 2008) Far Eastern 
Economic Review 48.
117 Donnabelle Gatdula, ‘Government Urged to Resolve Reed Bank Claims to 
Avoid International Row’ Philippine Star (7 August 2007) www.philstar.com/
business/11046/government-urged-resolve-reed-bank-claims-avoid-international-
row+&cd=2&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=hk. 
118 Philippine Information Agency Press Release 2008/03/09 Joint Statement of 
former Energy Secretary Vince Perez and former PNOC President Eduardo V Manalac. 
See Aileen Baviera, ‘The Influence of Domestic Politics on Philippine Foreign Policy: 
The Case of Philippines-China Relations Since 2004’. RSIS Working Paper No 241 
(2012), 2, 12–18. 
119 Ibid.
120 Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying’s Remarks on the Philippines’ 
Statement on the South China Sea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic 
of China, www.fmcoprc.gov.hk/eng/xwdt/wjbt/t1059343.htm. 
121 See www.pcoo.gov.ph/asean2011/backgrounder.htm. 
122 Paragraph 5.4 of the 2011 State of the Nation Address Technical Report, Official 
Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, www.gov.ph/2011/07/25/the-2011-state-of-
the-nation-address-technical-report. 
Journal of EnErgy & natural rEsourcEs law Vol 32 No 4 2014500
states would be to detect the presence of a viable resource that is either lying 
across disputed areas123 or straddling a disputed area and an undisputed area.124 
The foregoing discussion indicates that, in its present state, the Philippine 
petroleum regime does not take into account the potential or actual existence 
of transboundary petroleum deposits in the South China Sea. Consequently, 
Philippine practice in bilateral negotiations and agreements, specifically 
its ZoPFFC proposal, is ambivalent to the idea that other states may have 
coexisting interests in a deposit that traverses a disputed or settled boundary 
in the South China Sea.
To summarise this section, China, the Philippines and Vietnam assert title 
to the mineral resources on their claimed continental shelf in the South China 
Sea. Under its 1996 secrecy regulation, China does not perceive an obligation 
to notify or cooperate with a neighbouring state in regard to a transboundary 
deposit in a disputed area of the South China Sea. However, through negotiated 
declarations and agreement affecting both delimited and undelimited areas in 
the South China Sea, China acknowledges the coexisting interest of other states 
in a potential or actual transboundary deposit and an obligation to cooperate. 
Vietnam unilaterally and bilaterally acknowledges the coexisting interest of 
other states in a transboundary deposit and an obligation to cooperate. The 
Philippine petroleum regime does not provide the legal infrastructure for 
recognition of or negotiation on the coexisting interests of other states in 
a transboundary petroleum deposit. There are past and ongoing attempts 
to negotiate on the issue, but these are currently labelled ‘constitutionally 
impermissible’.125 These attempts are discussed in the next section. 
The next section reviews the mechanisms that may enable China, the 
Philippines and Vietnam to cooperate in regard to a transboundary deposit. 
The focus is on the role of the national or state petroleum corporation within 
the mechanisms provided by their model contracts. The discussion will look 
more closely into the Philippine experience, although there will be preliminary 
discussions on the mechanisms available in China and Vietnam.126 
123 Ralf Emmers, Resource Management and Contested Territories in East Asia (Palgrave-
McMillan 2013), 63.
124 See Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf area between Iceland and Jan 
Mayen: Report and recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and Norway 
(1981) 20 ILM 830. 
125 Antonio Carpio, ‘The Rule of Law in the West Philippine Sea’ (speech delivered before 
the Philippine Bar Association, 29 August 2013), www.imoa.ph/speech-the-rule-of-law-
in-the-west-philippine-sea-dispute.
126 The official model contracts of the Philippines and Vietnam are available. Despite best 
efforts by the University of Hong Kong Library, official copies of the model contracts 
of China could not be obtained. There are excerpts of the CNOOC model contracts in 
Smith, n 53 above, 444–458, citing Barrows Company Inc; and Jacqueline Weaver and 
David Asmus, ‘Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the World: A Comparative Analysis 
of National Laws and Private Contracts’ (2006) 28 Houston Journal of International 
Law 123–124, citing Barrows Company Inc. This article has referred to these excerpts. 
501Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea?
Mechanisms for dealing with transboundary petroleum deposits
pHilippines
The Philippine State exercises its sovereign rights to explore and exploit 
the continental shelf by undertaking offshore exploration and development 
directly127 or indirectly,128 through service contracts129 awarded either to the 
PNOC or to a local or foreign oil company.130
When it was created in 1973, PNOC was vested with the plenary power to 
‘undertake, by itself or otherwise, exploration, exploitation and development 
of all energy resources of the country, including surveys and activities related 
thereto’,131 and ‘to undertake all other forms of petroleum or oil operations 
and other energy resources exploitations’.132 For this purpose, PNOC could 
‘enter into contracts, with or without public bidding, with any person or entity, 
domestic or foreign, and with governments for the undertaking of the varied 
aspects of oil or petroleum operation, and energy resources exploitation’.133 
By virtue of its power to contract directly, PNOC was able to conclude crude 
oil supply contracts with foreign governments such as China and Kuwait.134 
PNOC retained this power even after the creation of the Ministry of Energy 
in 1977 under Presidential Decree No 1206.135 However, in 1992, Republic 
Act (RA) No 7638 placed PNOC under the supervision of the Department 
of Energy (DOE),136 which controlled all government activities relative to 
127 Section 4, Presidential Decree (PD) 87, 31 December 1972. 
128 Article 94 of the Petroleum Act authorised the Secretary of Natural Resources 
(formerly Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources) to enter into offshore 
service contracts. PD 87 (1972) and PD 782 (1975) transferred the authority to 
contract to the Petroleum Board. Contracting was conducted through bidding or 
negotiation (s 5, PD 87).
129 Section 6 of PD 87 provides that ‘in service contract, service and technology are 
furnished by the service contractor for which it shall be entitled to the stipulated 
service fee while financing is provided by the Government to which all petroleum 
produced shall belong’. If the government is unable to provide financing, s 7 provides 
that the contract ‘shall furnish services, technology and financing’ but it may recover 
the service fee and the operating expenses from the proceeds of sale of the petroleum 
produced. Under s 8(e), the contractor bears all exploration risks.
130 PD 334, as amended by PD 927, PD 1516, EO 171.
131 Section 5(a) of PD 334, as amended.
132 Ibid s 5(d).
133 Ibid s 5(e). 
134 Soo Lee (ed), Relations between West Asia and Southeast Asia (Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies 1978), 130. 
135 Under PD 1206, PNOC became an attached agency of the DOE (s 10). The power of 
PNOC to regulate other oil companies was transferred to the DOE (s 12(e)). PD 1573 
(1978) amended PD 1206 by transferring to the DOE the power of PNOC to regulate 
oil and petroleum operations (s 4(c)).
136 Section 13 of RA 7638.
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energy projects.137 PNOC no longer had the power to directly contract with 
foreign governments.138 The awarding of contracts is conducted through 
the Philippine Energy Contracting Round (PECR) system,139 in which even 
PNOC must bid,140 and if PNOC is awarded a service contract, it must, like 
any other winning contractor, conduct its operations according to the DOE-
prescribed model contract.141
Notwithstanding the restriction on its authority, PNOC signed a JMSU with 
CNOOC and PetroVietnam.142 The negotiations leading to the JMSU took 
place in the context of rising oil prices in 2004.143 The JMSU was seen as a 
necessary component of the Philippine’s ‘five-point energy independence 
agenda, to find and develop new indigenous petroleum reserves’.144 However, 
as earlier discussed, the JMSU was scuttled when the authority of PNOC to 
enter into the agreement, as well as the constitutionality of the survey area, 
were challenged.145 A senior member of the Philippine Supreme Court warned 
that any joint development effort with CNOOC in the disputed areas of the 
South China Sea ‘will negate the maritime entitlements of the Philippines 
under UNCLOS’, 146 a move that is ‘constitutionally impermissible’.147 He 
referred to the constitutional provision that international joint ventures in 
petroleum, even at the exploration stage, must have 60 per cent participation 
of Filipino citizens, unless the President himself enters into agreements 
‘for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, 
petroleum’.148 It would seem that, based on the government’s interpretation 
of this provision, the mechanisms for cooperation in regard to transboundary 
offshore petroleum are limited to either treaty or executive agreement, both 
of which are negotiated and concluded at the state level.
137 Ibid s 5(d).
138 Ibid s 4.
139 Department Circular No DC2003-05-005.
140 Ibid. 
141 Section 1(4)(a)1 of Department Circular No DC2009-04-0004 and s 4(3)(a) of 
Department Circular No DC2011-12-0010. 
142 Official announcement available at www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zwjg/zwbd/t187333.htm.
143 Philippine Information Agency Press Release 2008/03/09 Joint Statement of former 
Energy Secretary Vince Perez and former PNOC President Eduardo V Manalac.
144 Ibid.
145 It is not clear whether Philippine President Arroyo merely witnessed the signing of 
the JMSU, but did not sign the document itself or any other document ratifying the 
act of PNOC. 
146 Justice Antonio Carpio, ‘The rule of law in the West Philippine Sea’ (speech delivered 
before the Philippine Bar Association, 29 August 2013).
147 Ibid. The Foreign Affairs Secretary echoed this view (see SFA Statement on the 
UNCLOS Arbitral Proceedings against China, Q and A No 24, 22 January 2013, 
available at www.dfa.gov.ph/index.php/2013-06-27-21-50-36/unclos/216-sfa-statement-
on-the-unclos-arbitral-proceedings-against-china).
148 Article XII, s 2 of the 1987 Constitution.
503Is the Rule of CaptuRe CountenanCed In the south ChIna sea?
The Philippine model contract recognises the concept of unitisation. The 
contractor can negotiate for unitisation in the event that an oil or gas field 
is found to extend beyond a contract area or when a non-commercial field 
can be made commercial by linking it to other fields,149 provided the overall 
development plan is approved by the DOE.150 However, as presently worded, 
the model contracts contemplate unitisation of a purely national scope. 
To recapitulate, in its present state, the Philippine petroleum regime does 
not have the legal infrastructure to deal with the actual or potential presence 
of a transboundary petroleum deposit in the South China Sea. 
vietnam
Compared to the Philippines, Vietnam has more extensive state practice 
in joint exploration/development and unitisation. To recall, in its own 
laws, Vietnam unilaterally subscribes to the idea of coexisting interests in 
transboundary resources.151 In its 1992 memorandum of understanding 
with Malaysia, Vietnam committed to the joint exploration of a defined area 
where their claims overlap, and to cooperate if a petroleum field straddles the 
defined area and the continental shelf of either party.152 Vietnam made similar 
commitments to Thailand, in their 1997 maritime boundary agreement,153 
and to China, in their 2004 Gulf of Tonkin agreement.154 
Prior to their 1992 memorandum of understanding, Vietnam and Malaysia 
had awarded overlapping blocks in the Gulf of Thailand.155 In Vietnam’s 
Block 46 Cai Nuoc, Petrofina had surveyed strong prospects, but it was the 
discoveries by Hamilton Oil Co in the adjoining Block PM-3 of Malaysia that 
encouraged the parties to come to an understanding.156 Operators of PM-3 
had found that the structure in Malaysia’s Block PM-3 actually crosses into 
Vietnam’s Block 46.157 
149 Paragraph 9(5) of the 2003 PERC Model Contract; para 9(05) and 9(06) of the 2006 
PERC Model Contract; para 9(05) and 9(06) of the 2011 PERC Model Contract.
150 Paragraph 2(46) of the 2001 PERC Model Contract; para 9(04) of the 2005 PERC 
Model Contract; para 2(50) of the 2011 PERC Model Contract.
151 Decree No 48/2000/ND-CP of 12 September 2000 Detailing the Implementation of 
the Petroleum Law; Law Amending and Supplementing a Number of Articles of the 
Petroleum Law, 3 June 2008.
152 Article 2(2) of the Malaysia –Vietnam Memorandum of Understanding. 
153 Article 4 of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and 
the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
154 Article VII of the Agreement Between the People’s Republic of China and the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam on the Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, Exclusive Economic 
Zones and Continental Shelves of the Two Countries in Beibu Gulf/Bac Bo Gulf.
155 ‘Viet Nam Moves to Settle Offshore Territorial Disputes’ (1992) 90(13) Oil and Gas 
Journal 80 (3 October 1992).
156 Ibid.
157 Clive Schofield, Maritime Boundary Delimitation in the Gulf of Thailand, PhD Thesis 
(University of Durham 1999), 284.
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From mutual understanding with countries in dealing with a transboundary 
petroleum deposit, Vietnam progressed to actual joint exploration and 
international unitisation, and it kept apace by adopting mechanisms for 
cooperation. These mechanisms, as enumerated in its 2012 Law of the 
Sea, included not only international treaties158 but also ‘contracts signed 
in accordance with the provisions of Vietnamese legislation or with the 
permission of the Vietnamese Government’.159 
As earlier discussed, Vietnam has employed state-to-state negotiations to 
forge cooperation with Malaysia, Thailand and China in the South China 
Sea.160 However, the more dynamic mechanisms currently available to it are 
petroleum contracts involving PetroVietnam as ‘a state company having the 
function of signing and supervising the performance of petroleum contracts 
with foreign countries’.161 Its 2013 model contract deserves mention for 
under paragraph 18.2.2 international unitisation can be negotiated at the 
level of the operating company:
‘18.2.2 If any proven accumulation of Petroleum extends beyond the 
Contract Area into another adjacent contract area managed by another 
country, then the CONTRACTOR and the contractors concerned in 
such adjacent areas must negotiate in order to reach agreement on 
unitized development in order to jointly appraise, develop and produce 
such accumulation of Petroleum by a method generally agreed within 
the Petroleum Industry, and in accordance with same the costs and 
revenue arising shall be shared at an equitable ratio. Such agreement 
on unitized development must be approved by the Government of 
Vietnam and by the Government of the country concerned. The 
unitized areas shall be regulated by corresponding contracts and by a 
unitization contract.’162
The forgoing provision on international unitisation is a significant shift 
in policy for in the 2005 model contract – which Vietnam had previously 
applied – the provisions on unitisation did not contemplate the possibility of 
cross-border cooperation,163 much less cooperation initiated by an operator. 
Moreover, the language of the 2013 model contract makes negotiation 
towards transboundary cooperation obligatory and spontaneous on the part 
of Vietnam. Such mechanism is a clear departure from the outcome in RSM 
158 Adopted by the 13 National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam at the 3rd 
Session on 21 June 2012.
159 Article 16, s 3 and Art 17, s 5.
160 See s 2(2)(2).
161 Article 2 of Decision No: 198/2006/QD-TTg, 29 August 2006.
162 Adopted under Decree No 33/2013/ND-CP dated 22 April 2013.
163 Paragraphs 18(2)(1) and 18(2)(2) of the 2005 Model Petroleum Production Sharing 
Contract attached to Decree No 139-2005-ND-CP, 11 November 2005.
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v Grenada wherein operators were declared without authority, personality 
and cause to involve themselves in a maritime dispute between two states.164 
The 2013 model contract is remarkable in its flexibility and liberality, 
especially when set in the context of a volatile South China Sea. For one, 
Vietnam authorises its operator to negotiate with the adjoining or opposite 
operator the terms of a unitisation agreement, subject only to the approval 
of the management committee. Technically, the Government of Vietnam 
will involve itself only at the stage of approval of the terms of the agreement, 
although it may be argued that the equal participation of PetroVietnam in 
the management committee165 would mean that the government shall be 
informed and consulted every step of the way. More than that, the right 
of the contractor and management committee to negotiate and adopt an 
international unitisation agreement is enforceable by arbitration under 
paragraph 15.1.2. Undoubtedly, this international unitisation provision in 
the 2013 model contract provides Vietnam with the necessary and efficient 
mechanism to deal with a potential or actual transboundary deposit in the 
South China Sea. 
cHina
China’s model contracts do not contain an international unitisation clause 
akin to that of Vietnam’s 2013 model contract. The unitisation clause in 
China’s 1992 and 2008 CNOOC model contracts are similar in tenor to that 
of the Philippines and limited in its contemplation to unitisation agreements 
of a purely national scope. The CNOOC model petroleum contract provides 
that if ‘an offshore oil or gas field straddles a boundary, CNOOC shall arrange 
for the Contractor and the neighboring parties involved to work out a unitized 
Overall Development Program for such field and to negotiate the provisions 
164 RSM Production Corporation v Grenada, ICSID Case No ARB/05/14.
165 The 2013 Model Petroleum Production Sharing Contract provides:
‘3(1) Within thirty (30) Days from the Effective Date, the Parties shall 
set up a Management Committee under this Contract. The Management 
Committee shall be responsible for assisting PETROVIETNAM and the 
CONTRACTOR to supervise and monitor all operations in the Contract Area 
pursuant to approved Work Programs and Budgets and in accordance with 
this Contract. The Management Committee shall have the following rights 
and obligations:
- To approve and confirm implementation of annual Work Programs and 
Budgets and any amendments thereto’…
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thereof’.166 The first unitisation agreement entered into by CNOOC was with 
Texaco China BV involving two fields in Bohai Bay.167
CNOOC is vested with authority to engage in cooperation across defined 
or undefined boundaries. Since 1982, CNOOC, as a state corporation with 
a legal personality,168 has had the overall responsibility ‘for Sino-foreign 
exploitation of offshore petroleum resources of the People’s Republic of 
China... the exclusive right to prospect for, develop, produce and market 
petroleum within the zones of cooperation with foreign enterprises’.169 It may 
establish regional corporations and specialised corporations to carry out tasks 
delegated to it by the head office.170 However, as to whether CNOOC would 
venture into a cooperative arrangement across an international boundary, 
it would all depend on the outcome of bilateral political negotiations by the 
Chinese Government with its neighbours, such as with Vietnam in the Gulf 
of Tonkin. Such cooperation could also depend on corporate negotiation 
with another national oil corporation or contractor, such as PNOC or Forum 
Energy, but this mode of negotiation would all depend on the extent of 
authority of the latter corporations. It is notable that, in the wake of efforts 
by Forum Energy to involve CNOOC in Service Contract No 72 in the 
disputed Reed Bank, the Ambassador of China to the Philippines urged 
the Philippine Government to authorise the private sector to engage in a 
mode of cooperation with CNOOC.171 Despite the fact that the Philippine 
Government responded by filing with ITLOS a notification and statement of 
claims against China,172 the Ambassador of China has reiterated the call for 
joint exploration involving the private sector.173It would appear that China 
166 Article 11(7) of the Model Contract for Fourth Offshore Bidding Round 1992. Under 
Art 11(8), recourse to unitisation is likewise called for if a ‘petroleum-bearing trap 
without commercial value within the Contract Area can be most economically developed 
as a commercial Oil Field and/or Gas Field by linking it up with facilities located outside 
the Contract Area’. These provisions are as cited in Weaver, n 126 above.  
167 See CNOOC press release, ‘CNOOC and ChevronTexaco Step Forward to Develop the 
Large BZ25-1/25-1S Field in Bohai Bay’, 14 October 2002.
168 Article 1982 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Exploitation 
of Offshore Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises.
169 Article 6 of the Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Sino-Foreign 
Cooperative Exploitation of Offshore Petroleum Resources, Decree No 607 of the State 
Council, 1 November 2011.
170 Ibid.
171 Carlos Sumayao, ‘China, Philippines seek private sector deals’, Asia Pacific Defense 
Forum, 29 January 2013, http://apdforum.com/en_GB/article/rmiap/articles/
online/features/2013/01/29/philippines-china-oil. 
172 Notification and Statement of Claim dated 22 January 2013. China rejected the claim 
(see Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs On China’s response to the 
Philippines’ Arbitration case before UNCLOS, 19 February 2013).
173 Speech by Ambassador Ma Keqing at the Manila Rotary Club, 29 September 2013.
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has demonstrated a preference for the private sector or semi-private sector 
mechanism of cooperation in the South China Sea. 
To sum up this section, in Vietnam there are legal mechanisms that easily 
facilitate cross-border unitisation and joint exploration or development. No 
such legal mechanisms can be found in the petroleum regime of China and 
the Philippines. However, CNOOC itself has the authority and flexibility to 
forge cross-border cooperation following bilateral or corporate negotiations. 
China has called upon the Philippines to give similar authority to PNOC 
or to the private sector, but the Philippines has not acted in this direction.
Conclusion
The potential or actual presence of transboundary petroleum deposits 
across defined and undefined boundaries makes for a volatile situation in 
the South China Sea. The principle of sovereign rights under international 
law aggravates, rather than regulates, the situation, for if pursued to 
its logical end, the principle countenances the rule of capture in the 
international context.
This article posed the question whether China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam apply or are poised to apply the rule of capture in the South China 
Sea. It analysed the natural resource and petroleum regimes and bilateral 
agreements and undertakings of the three countries, for in these instruments 
the three countries formally define their rights and obligations in regard 
to a transboundary petroleum deposit in the South China Sea. Based on 
these instruments, China and Vietnam acknowledge the potential or actual 
presence of a transboundary petroleum deposit across their defined or 
undefined boundaries. Vietnam unilaterally and bilaterally expresses this 
acknowledgment in law, regulation, contract and agreement. China expresses 
this acknowledgment in bilateral agreements and undertakings. However, 
China has a subsisting secrecy regulation, which authorises CNOOC to 
withhold information relating to transboundary deposits in disputed areas 
in the South China Sea that are not governed by any bilateral agreement 
or declaration. Meanwhile, the Philippines has not defined its policy on the 
potential or actual presence of transboundary petroleum deposits or on the 
status of these deposits.
Furthermore, Vietnam installed in its petroleum law and model contract 
mechanisms by which cooperation in regard to a transboundary petroleum 
deposit is easily facilitated. China has no similar legal mechanism, but 
it equipped CNOOC with a level of corporate autonomy to forge such 
cooperation. The Philippines has no similar mechanism for it has clipped 
the authority of PNOC.
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It might be concluded that, in relation to potential or actual transboundary 
petroleum deposits in the South China Sea, Vietnam clearly and absolutely 
does not countenance the application of the rule of capture. China has 
maintained its 1996 secrecy regulation in regard to discoveries and activities 
involving transboundary deposits; however, it has also adopted bilateral 
declarations and agreements that preclude the application of the rule of 
capture. The Philippines has yet to make up its mind. 
